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While there is an extensive literature on the theory of in…nitely repeated games,
empirical evidence on how “the shadow of the future” a¤ects behavior is scarce and
inconclusive. We simulate in…nitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games in the lab by
having a random continuation rule. The experimental design represents an improvement
over the existing literature by including sessions with …nite repeated games as controls
and a large number of players per session (which allows for learning without contagion
e¤ects). We …nd strong evidence that the higher the probability of continuation, the
higher the levels of cooperation. We compare the behavior from these in…nitely repeated
games with behavior from …nitely repeated games of the same expected length and
we …nd that there is more cooperation in the in…nitely repeated games. Finally, we
consider di¤erent payo¤s matrices that result in di¤erent equilibrium outcomes for some
probabilities of continuation, and …nd that the set of observed outcomes closely follows
the set of equilibrium outcomes.
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11 Introduction
Game theorists have long recognized that repeated playing and the possibility of fu-
ture interaction may modify current behavior. The possibility of future interaction may
enable players to establish punishment and reward structures to prevent or limit oppor-
tunistic behavior.
While there has been a large number of theoretical papers on this subject, the empir-
ical and experimental evidence is scarce and in most cases inconclusive or characterized
by methodological problems. We run a series of experiments to study whether the
possibility of future interaction modi…es players’ behavior, allowing them to prevent
opportunistic actions.
In…nitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games are simulated in the experiment by
having a random continuation rule. The experimental design represents an improvement
over the existing literature by including sessions with …nite repeated games as controls
and a large number of players per session (which allows for learning without contagion
e¤ects).
We …nd strong evidence that the higher the probability of continuation, the higher
the levels of cooperation. While in one shot prisoner’s dilemma games the cooperation
rate is 9%, for a probability of continuation of 3/4 it is 38%. The e¤ect of the shadow
of future on the levels of cooperation is greater than previous studies have shown and
suggests thatself-enforcing reward and punishment schemes that eliminate opportunistic
behavior are important in practice as well as in theory.
In addition, wecomparetheresults fromthein…nitely repeatedgameswiththeresults
from …nitely repeated games to test whether cooperation depends on “the shadow of the
future,” as theory predicts, or merely on the length of the games. The lengths of the
…nitely repeated games were chosento coincide withthe expectedlengths of thein…nitely
repeated ones. In the …nitely repeated games the levels of cooperation are signi…cantly
lower than in the in…nitely repeated ones. For example, in repeated games with a …nite
2horizon of 4 rounds the cooperation rate is 21% against 38% in the in…nitely repeated
games with a probability of continuation of 3/4.
Finally, to study how closely the behavior of the subjects matches the theoretical
predictions, we use the fact that di¤erent prisoner’s dilemma payo¤ matrices result
in di¤erent sets of equilibrium outcomes. We used two di¤erent payo¤ matrices in the
experiment with the peculiarity that, for aprobabilityof continuationof1/2, cooperation
for bothplayers is anequilibrium inonebut not inthe other. We…ndthatthe percentage
of outcomes in which both subject cooperate is almost 19% when it is an equilibrium,
while it is less than 3% when it is not. These experimental results show that behavior
closely, but not perfectly, follows the theoretical predictions that are dependent on the
payo¤ details of the stage game, providing further support to the theory of repeated
games.
The experimental evidence presented here shows that the shadow of the future mat-
ters and it signi…cantly reduces opportunistic behavior as predicted by theory.
The next section summarizes previous experimental research on the topic. Section
3 describes the experimental design and section 4 describes the theoretical predictions.
Section 5 presents the results of the experiment and the last section concludes.
2 Previous Experiments
While there exists extensive experimental literature on …nitely repeated games, the ex-
perimental evidence on in…nitely repeated games is scarce and in most cases inconclusive
or exhibits methodological drawbacks.
Previous experiments on in…nitely repeated games are of two types: 1) experiments
with a random continuation rule known to the subjects and 2) experiments with a …nite
number of repetitions known to the experimenter but unknown to the subjects. In the
…rst type, subjects knew that there was always a positive probability of continuation.
In the second type, games were not in…nitely repeated since there was a …nal round, but
3this round was unknown to the players. Therefore, in each round the subjects may have
assigned a positive probability of continuation.
Experiments that fall into the …rst category are those of Roth and Murnighan [16]
and Murnighan and Roth [13]. These two papers present results of experiments with
in…nitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma for di¤erent continuation probabilities. Roth and
Murnighan [16] …nd that the higher the probability of continuation, the higher the
number of players that cooperatedinthe …rstperiodofthegame, see Table1. Murnighan
andRoth[13] present results for experiments with twelve di¤erent variations ofprisoner’s
dilemma. Considering the results of the twelve variations together, higher probabilities
of continuation did not result in more cooperation in the …rst round, in contrast to the
results of Roth and Murnighan [16], see Table 1.
Table 1: Percentage of cooperation in the …rst round game
Probability of continuation
Roth and Murnighan [16]a




a) Over 121 subjects. b) Over 252 subjects
In addition to presenting contradictory evidence (and o¤ering little hope that op-
portunistic behavior can be limited by increases on the shadow of the future), these
two papers display methodological problems which are discussed in Roth [15]. In both
experiments, subjects played against the experimenter instead of playing against each
other. In Roth and Murnighan [16] subjects were told that they were playing against the
experimenter but were not told that the experimenter was following the tit-for-tat strat-
egy. In Murnighan and Roth [13] subjects where told that they where playing against
each other while in fact they where playing against the experimenter who was following
either the tit-for-tat or grim strategy. In addition, in both experiments subjects where
not paid proportionately to the “points” they earned during the experiments. In Roth
4and Murnighan [16] “the best player” in the experiment received a $10 price, while
in Murnighan and Roth [13] the player with the highest average score in each session
received $40 and the second one $20.
Another experiment that employed a random continuation rule is Feinberg and
Husted [5]. They combine a …xed continuation probability with di¤erent discount factors
(they shrink the payo¤s in every round) to study the e¤ect of repetition on the levels of
cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma game disguised as a duopoly game. They …nd that
the levels of cooperation increase as the discount factor increases. Nevertheless, that
increase is small and far from the increase needed to fully exploit the possible bene…ts
from cooperation even when the experiment and it instructions were purposely designed
to facilitate cooperation. In addition, these results are weakened because the payments
made to the subjects were quite low and the basic payo¤s were not the same in all
treatments1.
Another experiment in which subjects faced a random continuation rule was con-
ducted by Palfrey and Rosenthal [14]. This paper presents an experiment designed to
test whether the possibility of future interaction leads to greater cooperation in pub-
lic good games with incomplete information. They compare the rate of contribution
to a public good when players meet only once with each other and when they meet
repeatedly with a probability of continuation of 0.92. They …nd that repetition leads
to more cooperation than one shot games but this increase is small (the percentage of
contribution goes from 29% to 40%). They concluded that “This contrast between our
one-shot and repeated play results is not encouraging news for those who might wish to
interpret as gospel the oft-spokensuggestion that repeated play withdiscount rates close
to one leads to more cooperative behavior. True enough it does-but not by much.”3 As
1Another experiment that used a random continuation rule to study repeated oligopoly games is Holt
[8]. Since this experiment was designed to test for consistent-conjectures, the results do not provide
information regarding cooperation.
2There were at least 20 rounds, after which the probability of continuation was 0.9.
3Palfrey and Rosenthal [14], pag. 548.
5the authors suggest later, the power of repeated play may be more evident in a simpler
environment.
One drawback to the experiments with a random continuation rule is that it is not
clear that as the probability of continuation increases any increaseof cooperationthat we
witness is due to an increase in the importance of the future as theory predicts or if it is
merely due to an increase of the repeated game expected horizon. There is experimental
evidence that subjects cooperate more in …nitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games
than in one-shot ones (see Andreoni and Miller [2] and Cooper et al. [4]). One reason
for this e¤ect is that in …nitely repeated games subjects may have incentives to build
reputations if there is incomplete information (see Kreps et al. [12]). Therefore, if we
observe an increase in cooperation as the probability of continuation increases, it could
be due to an increase on reputation e¤ects as the expected horizon of the game increases
and not to the in…nitely repeated feature of the game.
Therearesome oldrepeatedoligopoly experiments, liketheonespresentedinFouraker
and Siegel [6], that fall into the second category of games in which the number of repeti-
tions was known to the experimenter but not to the subjects. In each round the subjects
may assign a positive probability of continuation andwe may consider these experiments
of in…nitely repeated games, at least in the minds of the subjects. Fouraker and Siegel
[6] …nd some cooperation in Cournot duopoly markets but not in triopoly markets.
All experiments with a …xed number of rounds unknown to subjects raise the prob-
lem that the experimenter can not control for the players’ beliefs with respect to the
continuation of the game4.
A more recent paper in this category is Brown Kruse et al. [3] which presents an
experiment on repeated price competition in an oligopoly market with …xed capacity
constraints. While they observe prices above competitive levels, those prices are far
below the monopoly price. In addition, in the treatments in which collusion is more
4This type of design also adds a source of incomplete information since subjects may not know what
others subjects beliefs are.
6easily supported (requires a lower belief of continuation) the prices are lower. This
contradicts what we would expect from in…nitely repeated game theory, which predicts
that when collusion is easier to support, higher prices should be observed if some of the
subjects coordinate in collusive equilibria.
Previous experimental results do not provide much support for the theory of in…-
nitely repeated games and that self-enforcing reward and punishment schemes are used
to overcome opportunistic behavior. But given the shortfalls of some experiments’ de-
sign, (i.e. no real interaction among subjects, …nal earnings that are not proportional
to the payo¤s during the game, low earnings, …xed number of rounds unknown to the
subjects and lack of control sessions), and the complicated environment of others (i.e.
environments of incomplete information), previous experimental evidence is insu¢cient
to assess the degree in which the theory of in…nitely repeated games is supported em-
pirically. This paper presents results from an experiment that was designed to overcome
the above mentioned shortcomings and shows not only that the shadow of the future
matters, but that its e¤ect is signi…cant and that it closely, but not perfectly, follows
the theoretical predictions.
3 Experiment design
The design of this experiment allows for a better testing of the theory of in…nitely re-
peated games. We used simple stage games: prisoner’s dilemma games. The subjects
interacted with each other through computer terminals anonymously (see Figure 1) and
the pairing of subjects was done such that there was no possibility of interaction or
contagion e¤ects among the di¤erent repeated games. We controlled for the subjects’
discount factors by having a know probability of continuation. The subjects’ …nal earn-
ings were proportional to the points earned during the experiment plus a show up fee.
The exchange rate points/$ ensure that subjects had signi…cant incentives to try to
increase their earnings.
7Figure 1: Computer screen that subjects saw before each interaction.
In addition, the experimental design incorporates three important new elements.
First, in addition to the random continuation rule sessions, we run sessions with …xed
…nite horizon games. The length of the …xed …nite horizon sessions were chosen to
coincide with the expected length of the random continuation rule ones. Therefore,
for the …rst time in the literature, the experimental design allows us to compare the
results from in…nitely repeated games with the results from …nitely repeated games to
test whether cooperation depends on “the shadow of the future”, as theory predicts, or
merely on the length of the games.
Second, we considered two di¤erent prisoner’s dilemma games that result in di¤erent
sets of equilibrium outcomes for some discount factors. In this way we can study how
closely the experimental results follow theoretical predictions that depend on details of
the payo¤ matrices.
Third, a large number of players participated in each session resulting in a large
number of interactions for each treatment and allowing for learning without contagion
8e¤ects.
Next we describe the main characteristics of the experiment in greater detail.
Stage game payo¤s: We consider two di¤erent stage games payo¤s, denoted PD1 and
PD25:






C 65 , 65 10 , 100





C 75 , 75 10 , 100
D 100 , 10 45 , 45
The sets of equilibrium outcomes for the in…nitely repeated version of these games
are described in the next section.
Public randomization device: To allow subjects to coordinate actions and rotate
through di¤erent outcomes, every ten seconds a random number between 1 and 1000
was displayed on a screen at front of the room.
Subjects’ total earnings: All payo¤s in the game were in points. At the end of each
session, the points earned by each subject were converted into dollars at the exchange
rate 200 points=$1 and paid privately in cash. In addition, subjects were paid a 5
dollar show up fee. In this way, subjects’ real earnings in dollars are proportional
(up to a constant) to the “points” obtained during the experiment. In addition, these
amounts seem signi…cant enough to in‡uence subjects’ behavior. In a session with …xed
…nite horizon games and 30 subjects the di¤erence between the maximum and minimum
possible earning is above 15 dollars6.
5While in the experiment the actions were called U and D for Red subjects and L and R for Blue
subjects, we will use here the usual names C and D.
6In the sessions with a random continuation rule this di¤erence depends, of course, on the realization
of the random continuation rule.
9In…nitely repeated games: In half of the sessions a random continuation rule was
used to induce in…nitely repeated games. This was done by having one of the subjects
-who had been selected as the monitor- roll publicly a four sided die after each round.
The randomization generates an in…nitely repeated game given that at the moment of
choosing an action there is always the possibility of interacting in future rounds with
the same subject.
The probability of continuation ±, of which three di¤erent values were considered,
is the principal treatment variable in these sessions. One treatment corresponds with
the one-shot game case: ± = 0 and the rest corresponds with positive probability of
continuations: ± = 0:5 and 0:75. This treatment variable allows us to control for the
subjects’ beliefs regarding the probability of continuation. We call these sessions “Dice”
sessions.
Finitely repeated games: In the other half of the sessions …xed …nite horizon games
were used. We considered three treatments that allows one to compare results with the
in…nitely repeated games experimental results: 1) one-shot game: H = 1, 2) two rounds
repeated game: H = 2 and 3) four rounds repeatedgame: H = 4. Note that the number
of rounds for these treatments corresponds to the expected number of rounds in the
random continuation rule treatments7. The number of rounds was common knowledge
among the subjects. We call these sessions “Finite” sessions.
Order of treatments: To control for learning e¤ects from one treatment to another,
two sessions were run for each kind of continuation rule (Dice and Finite) and payo¤
matrix (PD1 and PD2). For example, for PD1 and Dice we run one session with the
order (± = 0, ± = :5, ± = :75) and another with the inverse order (± = :75, ± = :5, ± = 0).
We call the …rst kind of session “Normal” and the last kind “USD” (up-side-down).
7In in…nitely repeated games with a continuation probability of ±, the expected number of rounds is
equal to
1
1¡±. Therefore, the expected number of rounds in the random continuation session will be 1,
2 and 4 for ± equal to 0, 0.5 and 0.75, respectively.
10Matching procedure: A rotation matching scheme was used to avoid potential in-
teraction and contagion e¤ects between the di¤erent repeated games8. In each session
subjects were divided in two groups: Red and Blue. In each match every Red subject
was paired with a Blue subject. Subjects were not paired with each other more than
once. In addition, subjects were not paired with someone that had played with someone
that had played with him or her or with someone that had played with someone that
had played with someone that had played with him or her, and so on. Thus, the pairing
was done in such a way that the decisions one subject made in one match could not
a¤ect, in any way, the decision of subjects he or her would meet in the future. All these
features were explained and made clear to the subjects.
Given that each subject was only matched once with each subject of the other color,
the total number of matches in a session is
N
2 , where N is the number of subject in a
session. Given that there are three treatment per session, in each treatment there are
N
6 matches. The size of the experimental lab CASSEL allowed us to run experiments
with up to sixty subjects, providing up to ten matches per treatment per subject. This
large number of matches has the advantage of allowing subjects to familiarize with each
treatment while also providing a large number of observations to study.
Sessions: Given the two stage games (PD1 and PD2), the di¤erent continuation
rules (Dice and Finite), the di¤erent treatments (± = 0;:5;:75, and H = 1;2;4), and
the change in the order of the treatments (Normal and USD), this experiment consists
of eight sessions with three treatments each. Each treatment, or part, consists of one
practice match for which subject are not paid and
N
6 real matches. Each match consists
of as many rounds as the continuation rule indicates.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium average payo¤s V (±)
4 Theoretical predictions
If we assume that the payo¤s in Table 2 are the actual total payo¤s that the subjects
obtainfrom the gameandthis is commonknowledge, that is if weabstract from problems
of interdependent utilities, altruism, taste for cooperation and reputation e¤ects, the set
of subgame perfect equilibria can be calculated using the results in Stahl [17]. Figure 2
shows the set of equilibrium average payo¤s (V (±)) in each game for each of the discount
factors used in the experiment. The outcomes that can be supported in equilibrium for
the di¤erent discount factors -and therefore the outcomes that according to theory we
should observe- are presented in Table 3.
Table 3: Equilibrium outcomes
± PD1 PD2
0 DD DD
0.5 DD, CD, DC DD, CC
0.75 DD, CD, DC, CC DD, CD, DC, CC
12New equilibria appear as the discount factor increases, allowing the subjects to reach
-in principle- higher levels of cooperation and payo¤s. We can think that some subjects
will make the most of this opportunity to cooperate, regardless of the fact that DD
remains an equilibrium for high discount factors. Therefore, we have the following
testable hypothesis9:
Hypothesis 1: The larger ±, the higher the levels of cooperation.
In the …nitely repeated games the theoretical prediction is that no cooperation is
possible. Therefore I have the following testable hypothesis10:
Hypothesis 2: In…nitely repeated games (± = :5 and ± = :75) result in higher levels
of cooperation than …nitely repeated games (H = 2 and H = 4).
From Table 3 we see that the set of equilibrium outcomes is di¤erent for PD1 and
PD2 for ± = :5. Under that discount factor, CC can be observed in equilibrium for PD1
but not for PD211. Therefore, we have the following testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: For ± = :5, PD2 results in more outcomes CC than PD1.
The …rst two hypotheses are quite general in the sense that they do not depend on
speci…c details of the payo¤ matrices and are robust to perturbations of the stage games.
In contrast, the last hypothesis is quite speci…c in the sense that it is closely based on
9It is important to note that for this hypothesis it is not necessary to assume that the subjects’ only
payo¤s from the stage game are the ones in Table 2. With di¤erent payo¤s the predictions presented
in Figure 2 and Table 3 may not be appropriate, but Hypothesis 1 can still be true. Abreu, Pearce and
Stacchetti [1] showed that the set of equilibrium payo¤s (and consequently the set of outcomes) that
can be observed in a in…nitely repeated game (even with imperfect monitoring), can not decrease when
the discount factor increases. Then, for any stage game in which DD is the only Nash equilibrium,
increases in the discount factor result in increases in the levels of cooperation.
10As mentioned before, the levels of cooperation in a …nitely repeated game may be positive given
reputation e¤ects. Unfortunately, to my knowledge, there is no theoretical result that allow us to
compare the set of equilibrium outcomes between …nitely and in…nitely repeated games under incomplete
information. Therefore, the following proposition is based solely on the theory for repeated games under
complete information.
11Note that cooperation can still be observed in equilibrium for PD1 given that the outcomes CD
and DC can be part of an equilibrium.
13the speci…ed payo¤ matrixes.
5 Experimental results
The experimental sessions were run between November 2001 and April 2002 with an
average length of one hour (without counting the time to pay subjects). The descriptive
statistics are in Table 4. Excluding the subjects selected to be monitors, 390 subjects
participated in the experiment, an average of 48.75 subjects per session with a maximum
of 60 and a minimum of 30. The subjects were UCLA undergraduates recruited through
advertisement in university webpages and signs posted on campus. 22.31% of the sub-
jects indicated that they were in one of the Economics major programs (Economics,
Business Economics, Mathematics/Economics and Economics/International Area Stud-
ies). The subjects performed a total of 22,482 actions and earned an average of $18.94
with a maximum of $25.85 and a minimum of $12.





























































*Starting Scheduled time and …nal actual time.
+Percentage of all Economics majors in the session.
Even when subjects participated in a practice match before the real matches of each
treatment, we should expect to see during the …rst matches of each treatment some
learning regarding the treatment characteristics and other’s subjects behavior. As you
can see in Table 5, there is clear learning regarding the possibilities of cooperation in
the ± = 0 treatment of the Dice sessions and all the treatments of the Finite sessions
(that is, in all the treatments with …xed horizons). For example, in the ± = 0 treatment,
cooperation goes from above 26% in the …rst match to less than 11% in the third match.






1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
26.26 18.18 10.61 11.62 12.63 12.63 5.56 5.26 5.26 5
28.36 27.12 34.58 35.53 21.60 19.08 29.84 35.96 28.16 50





26.56 18.23 16.67 17.19 11.98 8.02 6.79 10.49 6.14 6.67
19.79 15.89 14.84 9.64 11.46 10.80 12.04 10.19 6.58 6.67
31.64 30.34 30.47 25.52 25.13 23.77 16.36 19.75 14.91 20.83
*All rounds.
Given this learning regarding the treatments, in the analysis of the experimental
results we focus on the matches after the third.
5.1 Does cooperation increase with the shadow of the future?
Our …rst objective is to study how changes in the probability of future interaction a¤ect
the levels of cooperation. The experimental results show that the greater the shadow of
the future, the larger the levels of cooperation. Considering the aggregate results for the
Dice sessions (matches after third and all rounds) we see that cooperation is just above
9% for the one shot treatment, while it is above 27% and 37% for ± = :5 and ± = :75,
respectively -see Table 6 and Figure 3. These di¤erences are statistically signi…cant with
p values of less than 0.001. Therefore, the experimental results support Hypothesis 1:
the larger ±, the larger the levels of cooperation.
Table 6: Percentage of cooperation by treatment*
Dice Finite
± = 0 9.17
± = :5 27.41
± = :75 37.64
H = 1 10.34
H = 2 10.11
H = 4 21.43



























Figure 3: Cooperation by treatment (matches after third and all rounds)
In addition, these results show that the e¤ect of the shadow of the future is large:
the percentage of cooperation for ± = :75 is almost four times greater than for the one
shot treatment. The magnitude of this di¤erence is greater than previously found. For
example, in the public good experiments with incomplete information of Palfrey and
Rosenthal [14] the percentage of contributions increases only from 29% to 40% when the
treatment changes from one shot games to a random continuation rule with ± = :9. This
is also the case if we compare the results of this experiment with the results from Roth
and Murnighan [16] and Murnighan and Roth [13]12. While in those experiments the
percentage of cooperation in the …rst round less than doubles when the probability of
continuationincreases from 0.105to 0.895, inthisexperiment thepercentage cooperation
is four times higher with a probability of continuation of 0.75 than in one shot games.
These results support theideathat in…nitelyrepeatedinteractioncansigni…cantlyreduce
opportunistic behavior.
12Given the described characteristics of these experiments we compare the results for the …rst round
of each match.
175.2 In…nitely repeated games vs. …nitely repeated games
Our second objective is to compare the levels of cooperation in the Dice and Finite
sessions. As Table 6 shows, the percentage of cooperation is similar for the one shot
treatments in both types of sessions (p value = 0.507), showing that there are no sig-
ni…cant di¤erences in the “kind” of people that participated in each session. More
importantly, the percentage of cooperation in in…nitely repeated games (± = :5 and
± = :75) is greater than in …nitely repeated games (H = 2 and H = 4), with p values
of less than 0.001. Therefore, the experimental results support Hypothesis 2: in…nitely
repeated games result in larger levels of cooperation than …nitely repeated games.
Studying the levels of cooperation by round for each of the treatments (Table 7)
further supports the theory of repeated games. In the fourth round of the ± = :75
treatment the level of cooperation is signi…cantly greater than in the fourth (and last)
round of the H = 4 treatment (34.58% against 10.63%, with p value of less than 0.001).
The level of cooperation in the …nal round of the H = 4 treatment is similar to the level
of cooperation in one shot games. Therefore, the absence of a future a¤ects subjects
behavior in the …nal round of …nitely repeated games: they cooperate less when there is
no future. This seems to be understood by the subjects at the beginning of the game,
resulting in greater levels of cooperation in the …rst round of an in…nitely repeated game
than in the …rst round of a …nitely repeated game (46.20% against 34.58%, with p value
of less than 0.001). Similar reasoning applies to the comparison of the behavior for
± = :5 and H = 2.






1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
9.17
30.93 26.10 19.87 12.50 12.96







34.58 21.55 18.97 10.63
*Matches after third.
5.3 Do payo¤ details matter?
Our third objective is to compare the outcomes under PD1 and PD2 when ± = :5.
Remember that CC is not an equilibrium outcome under PD1 but it is under PD2.
Consistent with that, the percentage of outcomes in which both players cooperate is
signi…cantly lower under the payo¤ matrix PD1 than under PD2 when ± = :5 (3.17%
against 18.83% with a p value of less than 0.001). Note that this is not the case when
± = 0, implying that the di¤erence in the percentage of CC when ± = :5 can not be
attributed to di¤erences in the subjects that participated in the sessions under PD1 and
PD2. Thus, the experimental results support Hypothesis 3: For ± = :5, the payo¤s PD2
result in more outcomes CC than PD1.
Table 8: Distribution of outcomes by stage game and treatment*




















*Matches after third and all rounds.
19The percentage of outcomes in which only one subject cooperates (CD and DC)
is greater under PD1 than under PD2 (28,57% against 25.50%) as theory predicts.
Nevertheless, this di¤erence is not statistically signi…cant (p value of 0.19) showing the
di¢culty ofcoordinatingonalternating asymmetric outcomes even whenthereis apublic
randomization device available.
5.4 Do Economics majors behave di¤erently?
It is important to note that the support for all three hypotheses does not depend on
the major of the subjects. All three hypotheses are supported by the experimental
results for students in any of the Economics majors and students in the rest of the
majors. With respect to the …rst two hypothesis, for both Economics majors and Non-
Economics majors cooperation increases as the probability offutureinteraction increases
and cooperation is greater in in…nitely repeated games than in …nitely repeated games
-see Table 9.
However, there are di¤erences in behavior across majors. Economics majors coop-
erate signi…cantly less than Non-Economics majors in games with a …xed …nite horizon
(this di¤erence is signi…cant for the Finite sessions with p values of 0.009, 0.042 and less
than 0.001 for H=1, 2 and 4, respectively, but it is not signi…cant for ± = 0 with p value
of 0.45). But the evidence is contradictory regarding in…nitely repeated games. While
Economics majors cooperate more than Non-Economics majors for ± = :5 (p value of
less than 0.001), that is not the case for ± = :75. In fact, the percentage of cooperation
is lower for Economics majors, but this di¤erence is not signi…cant (p value of 0.159).
Table 9: Percentage of cooperation by treatment and major*
Dice Finite
Non-Econ Econ
± = 0 9.68 7.41
± = :5 26.65 29.97
± = :75 38.93 33.15
Non-Econ Econ
H = 1 12.19 4.44
H = 2 11.12 6.85
H = 4 23.81 13.81
*Matches after third and all rounds.
20With respect to the third hypothesis, PD1 results in a lower percentage of CC than
PD2 when ± = :5 (p values of less than 0.001 for both types of majors) for all subjects.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that this e¤ect is stronger for Economics majors.
















*Matches after third and all rounds.
6 Conclusions
The experimental evidence presented in this paper provides strong support for the ex-
tensive use of the theory of in…nitely repeated games by showing that the shadow of the
future matters and it signi…cantly reduces opportunistic behavior, closely following the
theoretical predictions.
The data produced in this experiment deserve further study. It remains for future
work to analyze the reward and punishment schemes used by the subjects. It would
also be important to study whether, given these schemes, subjects’ behavior constitutes
an equilibrium, or how close they are to an equilibrium, by measuring subjects’ average
losses as in Fudenberg and Levine [7].
7 Appendix: Instructions for PD2-Dice-USD Ses-
sion (4/9/02)
Welcome
You are about to participate in a session on decision-making, and you will be paid for your
participation in cash, privately at the end of the session. What you earn depends partly on
your decisions, partly on the decisions of others, and partly on chance.
21Please turn o¤ pagers and cellular phones now. Please close any program you may have
open on the computer.
The entire session will take place through computer terminals, and all interaction between
you will takeplace through the computers. It is important that you not talk or in any way try
to communicate with other participants during the session.
We will start with a brief instruction period. During the instruction period you will be
given a description of the main features of the session and will be shown how to use the
computers. If you have any questions during this period, raise your hand and your question
will be answered so everyone can hear.
General Instructions
In this session one participant will act as a monitor. The monitor will be paid a …xed
amount for the session. The monitor will assist in running the session and checking that the
session is run correctly. We will select the monitor now.
Open your envelope, and read the record sheet inside. If your sheet says ”monitor” you
are the monitor. Will the monitor please come to the master computer. If your sheet does
not say ”monitor” you will use this sheet later to record your participant number that will be
assigned by the computer and your …nal score. Keep your sheet in a safe place, you will need
it at the end of the session to receive your payment.
At this time, please pull out the dividers that separate you from your neighbors. During
the course of this session, please refrain from communicating with your neighbors.
Please double click on the Dice Icon.
In the dialog box, please enter your full name and select server #128.97.190.171, as shown
on thescreen at the front oftheroom, and click OK. This will log you on to the session. In the
upper side of your screen you can see you ID number for this session and your color - please
look at the example on the screen in the front of the room. Please write your participation ID
number in the record sheet that came in the envelope.
Any question?
The session you are participating in is broken down into 3 separate parts. At the end of
the last part, you will be paid the total amount you have accumulated during the course of
the 3 parts in addition to the show-up fee. Everybody will be paid in private after showing
the record sheet. You are under no obligation to tell others how much you earned.
During the session all the earnings are denominated in points. Your dollar earnings at the
end of the session are determined by the points/$ exchange rate posted on the board in the
front and back of the room. This exchange rate is equal to 200points/$. Therefore, 200 points
are equivalent to $1.
The participants are divided in two groups: Red and Blue.
Red and Blue participants will be matched together to interact in the following way. As
you see on the screen at the front of the room, the Red participant can choose between U or
D and the Blue participant can choose between L and R.
If theRed participant chooses U and theBlue participant chooses L, both earn 75 points.
22If the Red participant chooses U and the Blue participant chooses R, the Red participant
earns 10 and the Blue participant earns 100 points.
If the Red participant chooses D and the Blue participant chooses L, the Red participant
earns 100 and the Blue participant earns 10 points.
If the Red participant chooses D and the Blue participant chooses R, both earn 45 points.
The points of the Red participants are indicated on the screen in red, and the Blue partic-
ipant points are indicated in blue.
In addition, the screen will show on the right hand side the result of previous rounds of
the current match.
Every ten seconds, wewill generate a random number between 1 and 1000 and project this
number on the screens in the front of the room. You can use this number to select one of the
actions, if you want, like the ‡ip of a coin. For example, if you are a Red participant, you can
decide to choose U any time the random number is above, say, 200.
Part 1
We will begin the …rst part now. This …rst part will consist of 10 matches. In each match
every Red participant is paired with a Blue participant. You will not be paired twice with
the same participant during the session or with a participant that was paired with someone
that was paired with you or with someone that was paired with someone that was paired with
someone that was paired with you, and so on. Thus, the pairing is done in such a way that
the decisions you make in one match cannot a¤ect the decisions of the participants you will be
paired with in later matches or later parts of the session.
In this part, after each round the monitor will roll a four sided dice. If the numbers 1, 2
or 3 appear, the participants will interact again without changing pairs. If a 4 appears, the
match ends and participants are re-matched to interact with other participants. Therefore, in
this part, each pair will interact until a 4 appears. After that, a new match will start with
di¤erent pairs. Therefore you will interact until a 4 appears, with 10 di¤erent participants.
But …rst, we are going to teach you about this part of the session and how to use the
computer by going through one practice match. During the practice part do not hit any keys
until you are told to do so. You are not paid for the practice match; it is just for you to
familiarize yourself with the session and the computer program.
Your screen shows the possible actions you can choose, the actions the participant you are
matched with can choose, and the points. You may choose your action by pressing the desired
action at the side of the matrix now. If you are a Red participant you can press the actions in
red, U or D, and if you are a Blue participant you can press the actions in Blue, L or R. Make
your choices now. Once everyone in the room has made their selections and pressed con…rm,
your results from this round will appear on the screen.
Monitor, would you please roll the dice?
[1) If a 1, 2 or 3 appeared] A __ appeared therefore this match continues. Now you arein
the second (third, fourth, …fth,) round of the same match. You are still interacting with the
same participant. Your screen shows all the same information as before. In addition you can
23see on your right the result of the previous rounds. You may choose your action by pressing
the desired action at the sideof thematrix now. Makeyour choices now. Once everyonein the
room has made their selections and pressed con…rm, your results from this round will appear
on the screen. Monitor, would you please roll the dice? [If 1, 2 or 3 appeared go to 1). If 4
appeared go to 2)]
[2) If a 4 appeared] A 4 appeared therefore this match ended. On the screen you see a
dialog box with the pointsyou earned during thepracticematch. PressOKto end thepractice
match.
We have …nished with the practice match. Any questions?
We start now with the …rst part of the session. You will now participate in 10 matches,
each match paired with a di¤erent participant. In each match you will interact with the same
person until a 4 appears. Remember: your decisions in one match cannot a¤ect the decisions
ofthepeopleyou will interact with in future matches. This is not a practice; you will be paid!
Make your choices now. Remember to press con…rm.
Monitor, would you please roll the dice?
[1) If 1, 2 or 3 appears] A __ appeared. This match continues. You are still interacting
with the same participant. Make your choices now. Remember to press con…rm. Monitor,
would you please roll the dice? [If 1, 2 or 3 appeared go to 1). If 4 appeared go to 2)]
[2) If 4 appears] A 4 appeared. This match ends. On the screen you will see a dialog
box with the points you earned during this match. Press OK to be matched with the next
participant.
. . . .
This is the end of Part 1. On your screen you will see a dialog box indicating your point
and dollar points for this part. Press OK to move to the next part.
Part 2
We will begin the second part now. This part will consist of 10 matches. In each match
every Red participant is paired with a Blue participant. No pair will consist of the same
participants as in Part 1. As before, you will not be paired twice with the same participant
during the session or with a participant that was paired with someone that was paired with
you or with someone that was paired with someone that was paired with someone that was
paired with you, and so on. Thus, the pairing is done in such a way that the decisions you
make in one match cannot a¤ect the decisions of the participants you will be paired with in
later matches or later parts of the session.
In this part, after each round the monitor will roll a four sided dice. If the numbers 1 or
2 appear, the participants will interact again without changing pairs. If 3 or 4 appear, the
match ends and participants are re-matched to interact with other participants. Therefore, in
this part, each pair will interact until a 3 or 4 appear. After that, a new match will start with
di¤erent pairs. Therefore you will interact until a 3 or 4 appear, with 10 di¤erent participants.
But …rst, we are going to teach you about this part of the session and how to use the
computer by going through one practice match. During the practice part do not hit any keys
24until you are told to do so. You are not paid for the practice match; it is just for you to
familiarize yourself with the session and the computer program.
Asbefore, yourscreen showsthepossibleactionsyoucanchoose, theactionstheparticipant
you are matched with can choose, and the points. You may choose your action by pressing the
desired action at the side of the matrix now. Make your choices now. Once everyone in the
room has made their selections and pressed con…rm, your results from this round will appear
on the screen.
Monitor, would you please roll the dice?
[1) If a 1 or 2 appeared] A __ appeared therefore this match continues. Now you are in
the second (third, fourth, …fth,) round of the same match. You are still interacting with the
same participant. Your screen shows all the same information as before. In addition you can
see on your right the result of the previous rounds. You may choose your action by pressing
the desired action at the sideof thematrix now. Makeyour choices now. Once everyonein the
room has made their selections and pressed con…rm, your results from this round will appear
on the screen. Monitor, would you please roll the dice? [If 1 or 2 appeared go to 1). If 3 or 4
appeared go to 2)]
[2) If a 3 or 4 appeared] A __ appeared therefore this match ended. On the screen you
see a dialog box with the points you earned during the practice match.
Press OK to end the practice match.
We have …nished with the practice match. Any questions?
We start now with the second part of the session. You will now participat in 10 matches,
each match paired with a di¤erent participant. In each match you will interact with the same
participant until a 3 or 4 appear. Remember: your decisions in one match cannot a¤ect the
decisions of the people you will interact with in future matches. This is not a practice; you
will be paid!
Make your choices now. Remember to press con…rm.
Monitor, would you please roll the dice?
[1) If 1 or 2 appear] A __ appeared. This match continues. You are still interacting with
the same participant. Make your choices now. Remember to press con…rm. Monitor, would
you please roll the dice? [If 1 or 2 appeared go to 1). If 3 or 4 appeared go to 2)]
[2) If 3 or 4 appear] A __ appeared. This match ends. On the screen you will see a dialog
box with the points you earned during this match. Press OK to be matched with the next
participant.
. . . .
This is the end of Part 2. On your screen you will see a dialog box indicating your point
and dollar points for this part and your cumulative total points for the …rst two parts. Press
OK to move to the next part.
Part 3
Wewill begin the third part now. This part will consist of10 matches. In each match every
Red participant is paired with a Blueparticipant. No pair will consist of thesame participants
25as in Part 1 or 2. As before, you will not be paired twice with thesameparticipant during the
session or with a participant that was paired with someone that was paired with you or with
someone that was paired with someone that was paired with someone that was paired with
you, and so on. Thus, the pairing is done in such a way that the decisions you make in one
match cannot a¤ect the decisions of the participants you will be paired with in later matches.
In this part, each pair will interact once. After that, a new match will start with di¤erent
pairs. Therefore, you will interact once with 10 di¤erent participants.
But …rst, we are going to teach you about this part of the session and how to use the
computer by going through one practice match. During the practice do not hit any keys until
you are told to do so. You are not paid for the practice match; it is just for you to familiarize
yourself with the session and the computer program.
Asbefore, yourscreen showsthepossibleactionsyoucanchoose, theactionstheparticipant
you are matched with can choose, and the points. You may choose your action by pressing the
desired action at the side of the matrix now. Make your choices now. Once everyone in the
room has made their selections and pressed con…rm, your results from this round will appear
on the screen.
You have interacted once so this match ends. On the screen you will see a dialog box with
the points you earned during the practice match. Press OK to end the practice match.
We have …nished with the practice match. Any questions?
We start now with the third part of the session. You will now participate in 10 matches,
each match paired with a di¤erent participant. In each match you will interact with the same
participant once. Remember: your decisions in one match cannot a¤ect the decisions of the
people you will interact with in future matches. This is not a practice; you will be paid!
Make your choices now. Remember to press con…rm.
Press OK to be matched with the next participant.
Make your choices now. Remember to press con…rm.
Press OK to be matched with the next participant.
. . . . .
Make your choices now. Remember to press con…rm.
This is the end of Part 3. On your screen you will see a dialog box indicating your point
and dollar points for this part and your cumulative total points for the three parts. Press OK
to end this part.
Farewell
The session has ended. On your screen you will see a dialog box indicating your total
earnings for the session. Please make sure you record the dollar points in your record sheet.
Press OK to end the session. Take this sheet to the counter for payment. This sheet will be
matched to our computer print out of results for payment. Your payments will be rounded up
to the nearest quarter. Thank you for your participation.
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